This Ship is meant to be a long range assault ship, it has a torpedo bay that can build and fire torpedoes that can travel at least 10km to hit stationary targets, it also has a 16 rocket hellfire barrage and plenty of gatling turrets if anyone gets too close , small survival ready bridge but ship is mostly for combat
The Mark 14 torpedo was the United States Navy's standard submarine-launched anti-ship torpedo of World War II. This weapon was plagued with many problems which crippled its performance early in the war. It was supplemented by the Mark 18 electric torpedo in the last two years of the war. From December 1941 to November 1943 the Mark 14 and the destroyer-launched Mark 15 torpedo had numerous technical problems that took almost two years to fix.[3] After the fixes the Mark 14 played a major role in the devastating blow U.S. Navy submarines dealt to the Japanese naval and merchant marine forces during the Pacific War.
Space Engineers Torpedo Mod
The design of the Mark 14 started in January 1931; the Navy allocated $143,000 for its development.[4] The Mark 14 was to serve in the new "fleet" submarines and replace the Mark 10 which had been in service since World War I and was standard in the older R- and S-boats. Although the same diameter, the Mark 14 was longer, at 20 ft 6 in (6.25 m), and therefore incompatible with older submarines' 15 ft 3 in (4.65 m) torpedo tubes. Later in the war, the Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) stopped producing Mark 10s for the S-boats and provided a shortened Mark 14.[5]
The design for the Mark 6 exploder used in the Mark 14 torpedo had started at the Naval Torpedo Station (NTS), Newport, in 1922. Ship's armor was improving with innovations such as torpedo belts and torpedo blisters (bulges). To circumvent these measures, torpedoes needed larger warheads or new technology. One option would use a fairly small warhead[7][8] but was intended to explode beneath the keel where there was no armor.[9] This technology required the sophisticated new Mark 6 magnetic influence exploder, which was similar to the British Duplex[10] and German[11] models, all inspired by German magnetic mines of World War I.[9] The Mark 14 shared this exploder with the concurrently-designed surface ship Mark 15 torpedo.[1]
Torpedoes were sophisticated and expensive. The cost of a torpedo in 1931 was about $10,000 (equivalent to $178,000 in 2021).[18] The development of the Mark 13, Mark 14 and Mark 15 torpedoes was done frugally. The Navy did not want to do live fire tests that would destroy a $10,000 torpedo. The Navy was also reluctant to supply target ships. Consequently, there were no live-fire tests, and the designers had to rely on their judgment. Sadly, that judgment sometimes led to problems: a contact exploder that worked reliably at 30 knots (56 km/h) failed at 46 knots (85 km/h). In addition, the Navy had limited experience in using torpedoes in combat.[19]
The U.S. Navy has a long history of torpedo supply problems. In 1907, the Navy knew there was a problem with torpedo supply; a major contractor, the E. W. Bliss Company, could produce only 250 torpedoes per year.[20] During World War I, the Navy had almost 300 destroyers that each had 12 torpedo tubes.[21] The Bliss Company was to produce about 1,000 torpedoes for the Navy, but that production was delayed by demands for artillery shells and only 20 torpedoes were close to being shipped before WWI started for the U.S.[22] When war was declared on Germany, another 2,000 torpedoes were ordered. To produce large numbers of torpedoes, the government loaned $2 million to Bliss Company so it could build a new factory. Although the government had ordered 5,901 torpedoes, only 401 had been delivered by July 1918.[23] The supply problems prompted the Navy to build the U.S. Naval Torpedo Station, Alexandria, VA, but WWI ended before the plant was built. The plant produced torpedoes for five years, but was shuttered in 1923.
In 1923, Congress made NTS Newport the sole designer, developer, builder and tester of torpedoes in the United States. No independent or competing group was assigned to verify the results of Mark 14 tests.
The Navy had not learned from the torpedo supply lessons of WWI. Looking back in 1953, the Bureau of Ordnance stated, "Production planning in the prewar years was also faulty. Torpedoes were designed for meticulous, small-scale manufacture. When military requirements demanded that they be supplied in large numbers, a series of new problems was exposed. There were simply no realistic plans available for providing the weapon in adequate quantity."[24] There was little interest in torpedo production until 1933 when the Vinson Shipbuilding Program recognized the need for torpedoes to fill the torpedo tubes on its newly-constructed ships.[25] Consequently, Newport received new production equipment and an increased budget.[26] NTS produced only 1 torpedoes a day in 1937, despite having three shifts of three thousand workers[27] working around the clock.[28] Production facilities were at capacity and there was no room for expansion.[27]
By January 1938, unfilled torpedo orders at Newport amounted to $29,000,000. A forecast that did not include war estimated Newport would have a backlog of 2425 torpedoes by 1 July 1942.[26] More production was needed. The simplest route was to reopen the Alexandria Torpedo Station, but New England congressmen objected to reopening Alexandria; they wanted production concentrated in New England. The Navy side-stepped the opposition by including the Alexandria funds as part of the Naval Gun Factory's 1939 budget.[26] The Naval Torpedo Station at Keyport, Washington, was also expanded.
After the U.S. entered the war, the contract with American Can was expanded and Pontiac Motor Company, International Harvester, E. W. Bliss Company, and Precision Manufacturing Co. were retained as contractors. In May 1942, Westinghouse Electric Corporation was asked to build an electric torpedo (which became the Mark 18 torpedo).[32]
Only 2,000 submarine torpedoes were built by all three Navy factories (Newport, Alexandria, and Keyport) during 1942.[27][28] This exacerbated torpedo shortages; the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force had fired 1,442 torpedoes since war began.[33] "Until the spring of 1945, supply was a problem" for the Mark 14 torpedo.[34]
The Mark 14 was central to the torpedo scandal of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Submarine Force during World War II. Inadequate production planning led to severe shortages of the weapon. The frugal, Depression-era, peacetime testing of both the torpedo and its exploder was woefully inadequate and had not uncovered many serious design problems. Torpedoes were so expensive that the Navy was unwilling to perform tests that would destroy a torpedo. Furthermore, the design defects tended to mask each other.[36] Much of the blame commonly attached to the Mark 14 correctly belongs to the Mark 6 exploder. These defects, in the course of fully twenty months of war, were exposed, as torpedo after torpedo either missed by running directly under the target, prematurely exploded, or struck targets with textbook right angle hits (sometimes with an audible clang) yet failed to explode.[37]
Responsibility lies with the Bureau of Ordnance, which specified an unrealistically rigid magnetic exploder sensitivity setting and oversaw the feeble testing program. Its small budget did not permit live fire tests against real targets. Instead, any torpedo that ran under the target was presumed to be a hit due to the magnetic influence exploder, which was never actually tested.[37] Therefore, additional responsibility must also be assigned to the United States Congress, which cut critical funding to the Navy during the interwar years, and to NTS, which inadequately performed the very few tests made.[38] The Bureau of Ordnance failed to assign a second naval facility for testing, and failed to give Newport adequate direction.
Some of these flaws had the unfortunate property of masking or explaining other flaws. Skippers would fire torpedoes and expect the magnetic influence exploder to sink the target ship. When the torpedoes did not explode, they started to believe the magnetic influence exploder did not work. Against orders, some submariners disabled the magnetic influence feature of the Mark 6 exploder,[citation needed] suspecting it was faulty, and went for contact exploder hits; such efforts would confuse the issues. Looking back in 1953, the BuOrd speculated, "Many shots planned for impact against the side of a ship missed because of deep running, yet damaged the enemy due to the magnetic influence feature of the Mark 6."[40] When later tests discovered the torpedoes ran deeper than set, the submarine command then believed that the torpedoes ran so deeply that the magnetic influence exploder could not sense the target ship; the failure to explode had been due entirely to the depth setting and that nothing was wrong with the magnetic influence exploder. When the depth issue was fixed, the magnetic influence exploder's premature detonation made it seem like the exploder was working but little damage would be done to the target ship. It was only after the magnetic influence feature was deactivated that problems with the contact exploder would be discernible.
On 24 December 1941, during a war patrol, Commander Tyrell D. Jacobs in Sargo fired eight torpedoes at two different ships with no results. When two additional merchantmen came in view, Jacobs took extra care to set up his torpedo shots. He pursued the targets for fifty-seven minutes[41] and made certain the TDC bearings matched perfectly before firing two torpedoes at each ship from an average range of 1,000 yd (910 m). The shots should have hit, but all failed to explode.[42]
A few days after he discovered the torpedoes were running too deep, and corrected the problem,[43] Jacobs detected a big, slow tanker. Again, his approach was meticulous, firing one torpedo at a close range of 1,200 yd (1,100 m). It missed. Exasperated, Jacobs broke radio silence to question the Mark 14's reliability.[44] 2ff7e9595c
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